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Abstract
To support decision-makers considering adopting integrated pest management (IPM) cropping in
Norway, we used stochastic efficiency analysis to compare the risk efficiency of IPM cropping and con-
ventional cropping, using data from a long-term field experiment in southeastern Norway, along with data
on recent prices, costs, and subsidies. Initial results were not definitive, so we applied stochastic efficiency
with respect to a function, limiting the assumed risk aversion of farmers to a plausible range. We found
that, for farmers who are risk-indifferent to moderately (hardly) risk averse, the conventional system was,
compared to IPM, less (equally) preferred.
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1. Introduction
Increasing concerns about health, environmental, and social issues caused by inappropriate pes-
ticide use led to the introduction of the EU Framework Directive 2009/128/EE (EUFD), intended
to promote the adoption of integrated pest management (IPM). However, the complexity of IPM,
the crop- and area-based nature of these practices, and their diverse nature made the standardi-
zation of IPM impossible (Peshin, Vasanthakumar, and Kalra, 2009; Barzman et al., 2015;
Lefebvre, Langrell, and Gomez-y-Paloma, 2015). The many IPM options make it hard for farmers
to choose the IPM strategy that matches their circumstances and goals. Moreover, uncertainty
about the effectiveness of alternative IPM strategies in particular circumstances means that the
choice of strategy is risky, which may discourage some risk-averse farmers from adopting
IPM. In this paper, we compare conventional and IPM cropping systems for risk-averse
Norwegian farmers, accounting for a plausible range of risk aversion.
Benefit–cost analysis has been favored in most economic evaluations of IPM practices in
Europe. Bale, Van Lenteren, and Bigler (2008) concluded that, on the basis of benefit–cost ratios,
biological control is highly preferred over chemical control. Subsequently, Boussemart Leleu and
Ojo (2016) compared the use of pesticides with available pesticide substitutes and concluded that
agriculture practices with fewer pesticides are more profitable. However, those studies mainly
focused on one or few IPM practices, rather on whole cropping systems, so the interaction effects
of different IPM practices within one cropping system were not fully considered. Vasileiadis et al.
(2013) used a decision model that was both hierarchical and qualitative to evaluate and compare
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the economic and environmental sustainability of maize-based IPM cropping systems across four
European regions. Their conclusion was that innovative IPM systems applied in the four regions
were more environmentally sustainable than the current rotational systems and were equally as
economically sustainable1 as the current systems. Mouron et al. (2012) evaluated apple farming
systems, comparing results from five European regions, and found that, in some of the tested
regions, the increased cost of using IPM was fully compensated for by higher yields. However,
the last mentioned two analyses were largely based on qualitative judgments by experts. The quan-
titative data used were limited to just a few growing seasons, insufficient to represent the risk of
adverse economic outcomes.
In addition to the limitations of previous studies, noted above, decision-makers’ risk prefer-
ences have seldom been taken into account in IPM-based analyses. Pannell (1991) and Marra,
Pannell, and Ghadim (2003) argued that, for a better understanding and explanation of agricul-
tural technology adoption, it is important to include farmers’ attitudes to risk. Many authors have
studied the effect of farmers’ risk attitudes on technology adoption, for example, Feder (1980),
Chavas and Holt (1996), Koundouri et al. (2009), and Gandorfer, Pannell, and Meyer-Aurich
(2011). Cochran, Robison, and Lodwick (1985) evaluated strategies (including IPM) in apple pro-
duction and accounted for risk aversion by using stochastic efficiency analysis. Greene et al. (1985)
also used stochastic efficiency analysis to analyze alternative pest management strategies in soy-
bean production in Virginia. In a similar vein, in this paper, we seek to account for risk and risk
aversion in the choice between IPM and conventional cropping systems in Norway.
2. Aims
Our aim is to evaluate the risk efficiency of IPM-based Norwegian cropping systems. The partic-
ular climatic conditions and landscape traits in Norway differ from those in other European states,
so that evaluations of IPM conducted in other parts of Europe are not applicable to the Norwegian
case, where crops have a short growing season and the majority of farms are small. Moreover,
agriculture in Norway is supported by the government in different ways, and generally more
substantially, than in other European countries.
Our evaluation of the risk efficiency of IPM-based cropping systems in Norway is intended to
support decision-making by Norwegian farmers, policy makers, and other stakeholders. While our
results are specific to Norway, aspects of our methods may be of relevance to other such studies in
other countries. Based on our knowledge, by looking at effect of farmers’ risk preferences in a whole-
farm perspective, our study is a more complete analysis of IPM than most earlier IPM studies.
3. Methods
We were fortunate to have access to relevant quantitative empirical data. Our analysis is based on
10 years of experimental field-level data from a field experiment in southeastern Norway. Using
these data, we applied recent prices to outputs and updated costs and subsidies to recent levels
to derive, via a stochastic simulation model, distributions of net farm income for each of conven-
tional and IPM cropping. Finally, we evaluated the risk efficiency of the assessed distributions using
stochastic efficiency analysis, with various assumptions about the risk attitudes of target farmers.
In the next section, we provide information about the 10-year field experiment. Next, we
describe our stochastic net income model and its variables, including the updating of prices
and costs. We then report on the stochastic efficiency analyses we conducted and the paper
concludes with a discussion of the results and conclusions.
1One definition of economic sustainability at the level of the individual farm is that the farm business must remain finan-
cially viable while providing an acceptable livelihood for the farm family (Lien, Hardaker, and Flaten, 2007a).
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3.1. Experimental data and cropping systems
For this study, we used data from the long-term cropping systems experiment by Norwegian
Institute of Bioeconomy Research (NIBIO) at Apelsvoll (Eltun, 1994). Apelsvoll is located in
the southeast of Norway (see Figure 1), a farming region dominated by cereal and ley production.
The location is moderately representative of other cereal-farming areas of Norway.
The experiment was established in 1989 on a 3.2 ha field with tile-drained plots, comprising
12 blocks (30 m by 60 m) separated by 7.5 m wide grass border zones. The climate in this area is
humid continental, with annual average precipitation of 600 mm, and an average temperature of
12°C in the growing seasons, which normally lasts from May to September (Korsaeth, 2012). The
soil on the experimental site is mainly loam and silty sand, classified as an Endostagnic Cambisol
(Riley and Eltun, 1994).
Six cropping systems, each with two replicates, were established on the 12 blocks using a random-
ized complete block design. The systems included both cash crop production (cereals and potatoes)
and mixed dairy production (both arable and fodder crops). When designing and operating the sys-
tems, efforts were made to make them representative of real farms in the region, and this concept has
been followed during later changes to the management of the systems. Data from the three cash crop
systems, covering the period 1991–1999, have been used previously for economic risk assessment (Lien
et al., 2006; Lien, Hardaker, and Flaten, 2007a). However, IPM regulation and practices in Norway
became more developed after 2000. These new practices and regulations were applied to the IPM-level
cropping system in the experiment from 2001. We therefore decided to use data from the experiment
for the period 2001–2010 to reflect current IPM practices.
Our rationale for using data from the cropping system experiment instead of using data from
real farms is that farm practices change more or less continuously over time with new technology,
changed regulation, etc., which makes it hard to find sufficient and reliable long-term data for
analysis. By contrast, using data from the experiment, it is possible to compare effects of man-
agement on the same soil and under the same weather conditions, thereby reducing “noise”, which
might otherwise compromise the analysis.
IPM generally requires the combination of carefully considered pesticide use and nonchemical
strategies, such as crop rotation and cultivation (Benbrook, 1996). We decided to compare two
cropping systems from the experiment, one being the conventional cropping system that includes
Figure 1. Map of Norway showing location of the experiment (the blue dot).
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few IPM practices and the other being a system where IPM practices have been largely and
consistently implemented over the 10 years study period. In Table 1, we have summarized the
characteristics of the conventional and the IPM cropping systems.
Catch crops of ryegrass were included in the rotation for IPM, in which perennial ryegrass
followed barley and wheat, whereas Italian ryegrass followed oats. The catch crops were sown
only a few days after the cereals, at the time of the first weed harrowing, and ideally should not
grow much in the presence of the cereal cover crops, to minimizing competition. However, these
grasses grow quickly after the cereals are harvested in the autumn, until the temperature becomes
too low for growth. In this period, the catch crops take up nutrients from the soil, in particular
nitrates, which are otherwise exposed to losses via leaching and runoff during late autumn and
winter. Moreover, the catch crops are also effective competitors with weeds for water, nutrients,
and light, thus limiting weed growth during autumn.
Tillage in IPM was performed in spring only. This enabled the use of catch crops, but also
had the advantage of reducing tillage-related erosion and nutrient losses during late autumn
and winter; problems commonly enhanced by autumn ploughing (e.g. Korsaeth, Henriksen,
and Bakken, 2002).
The total fertilizer applications for IPM were about 4–10% less than those applied in the con-
ventional system. Another difference between the two fertilizer regimes was that, for IPM, the
fertilizer rates were adjusted to season-based growth conditions, which meant better synchroni-
zation between applied nutrients and the plant requirements.
Similarly, the use of pesticides for IPM was based on the assessed requirements, whereas a pre-
defined scheme was followed for the conventional cropping treatments. The IPM scheme included
the use of herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides for each crop of the rotation. In IPM, herbicides
were used for cereals only when weed harrowing (performed either before seed emergence of the
cereals or at growth stage 13–14) could not be performed owing to too wet conditions. On these
occasions (occurring roughly every 4–5 years), rates of herbicides used corresponded to about 50%
of a full dose (according to the specific product recommendation of the herbicide used). For pota-
toes, herbicides were used every year in IPM, with herbicide rates reduced to about 50% of a full
dose. The potatoes under IPM were also treated with fungicides, whereas fungicide treatment of
the cereals was performed only when there was a risk of diseases, as judged by weather conditions,
Table 1. Characteristics of conventional and IPM cropping systems
Farming practices Conventional IPM
Crop rotation Potatoes–wheat–oats–barley Potatoes–wheat–oats–barley
Tillage Autumn ploughing and spring harrowing Spring harrowing only
Under sown – Catch cropa
Fertilizer Intensive Balancedb
Mechanical weeding Only potatoes All crops








aA catch crop of ryegrass (perennial ryegrass following barley and wheat; Italian ryegrass following oats) was grown after the cereals to reduce
weed development in autumn and to reduce the risk of nutrient leaching and runoff during late autumn and winter. Included in the short gap
between the two main crops.
bFertilizer application in spring was based on measurement of soil mineral N content and expert recommendation. For the cereals, split
application of fertilizer was performed with about 75% given at sowing, and the rest applied at growth stage (GS) 37, with amounts
depending on sensor measurements of plant N status at time of split fertilization.
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field observations, and regional recommendations. A similar approach was used to regulate the
use of insecticides for all crops.
3.2. Stochastic income model
The two cropping systems can be ranked in terms of risk efficiency by comparing the probability
distributions of the incomes generated (Mahoney et al., 2004; Smith, Clapperton, and Blackshaw,
2004; Lien et al., 2006). We first built a model to calculate annual net farm incomes for each of
10 states corresponding to the 10 years of experimental results (Figure 2). The 10 discrete states
where treated as equi-probable. For the two cropping systems, we used the averages of the two
replicates. We assumed that both cropping systems have an area of 32 ha, approximating the aver-
age size of cropping farms in the area. We assumed the 32 ha to be distributed equally among four
crops, representing a crop rotation with 8 ha of each crop grown annually.
The mathematical form of the annual net farm income model is




eNIn is the stochastic net farm income of year n.
i : : : k stands for crops in rotation. Crops included are wheat, barley, oats, and potatoes.
Sin is the area for each crop i in year n in ha, assuming one-fourth of the cropped area is
occupied by each of the four crops every year.eYin is the stochastic yield per ha of crop i in year n in kg/ha.ePin is the stochastic/deterministic sale price per kg for crop i in year n.
VCin is the deterministic variable costs per ha for crop i in year n.
FCn is the deterministic fixed costs per farm in year n.
APin is the deterministic area payment (regional subsidy) per ha for crop i in year n.





















Figure 2. Net income model description.
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3.3. Description of variables for the stochastic income model
3.3.1. Yields
Farmers face the challenge of uncertain yields due to damage from bad weather, pest invasion
(Lu, Teasdale, and Huang, 2003), or crop diseases. The 2001–2010 empirical data collected from
the previously described two cropping systems (Table 2) were used to represent the 10 equally
likely states of nature for yields, reflecting the range of growing conditions affecting the trial plots.
We assume that these 10 states are a good representation of the riskiness of farm yields.
3.3.2. Prices
In Norway, policies are in place to protect farmers from low prices by a range of measures, includ-
ing production quotas, import tariffs, and subsidy payments. These support measures are negoti-
ated annually between the two farmers’ unions and the government (Knutsen, 2006). Target prices
are set for most commodities in the agricultural agreement. Thus, prices for most crops are
reasonably assured, as for barley and oats. However, for some crops, such as for wheat and pota-
toes, quality variation and/or market conditions affect prices received.
Based on the protein percentage and “falling number” (indicating the amount of sprout dam-
age), wheat is categorized as suitable for either human consumption or for animal feed. Wheat for
human consumption attracts a higher price. Within each category, wheat price increases as the
protein percentage of the product increases (Strand Unikorn, 2015). Therefore, wheat price is
treated as stochastic, so that the price per state is determined in part by variation in the general
price level between years and in part by the observed quality differences from year to year, as
observed in the field trial. The wheat prices in Table 2 and used in the analysis are adjusted
for inflation (2018 level, based on CPI).
Potato prices are market-determined, with large variation due to supply differences, so we
treated potato prices as stochastic. Because past price variations have been wider than observed
Table 2. Historical yieldsa of conventional and IPM cropping systems (kg/ha) and historical prices adjusted to 2018 level for
wheat and potatoes (NOK/kg) (NOK= Norwegian kroner, USD 1.00 ∼ NOK 9.00)
Conventional cropping system—yields IPM cropping system—yields Prices
Year Barley Wheat Oat Potatoes Barley Wheat Oat Potatoes Wheat Potatoes
2001 5,565 5,760 7,010 39,975 5,290 5,730 6,605 40,595 3.20 4.31
2002 5,245 5,215 5,285 36,270 4,795 3,770 4,270 35,445 3.20 4.12
2003 4,464 6,367 6,401 35,139 4,521 6,171 4,859 31,589 3.08 4.14
2004 4,712 3,433 5,769 48,083 5,408 3,569 5,487 48,450 3.20 4.24
2005 5,381 5,926 6,952 42,225 4,191 6,059 4,323 42,665 3.20 4.48
2006 4,917 5,614 3,797 33,435 4,554 5,735 4,431 35,138 3.16 4.95
2007 6,434 6,297 6,180 45,321 5,630 6,581 6,211 45,728 3.08 5.25
2008 6,181 7,083 6,718 42,366 5,879 6,945 6,222 44,050 3.09 4.80
2009 5,977 5,732 4,561 33,413 5,653 6,003 5,239 34,148 3.10 4.78
2010 5,630 5,533 6,301 38,423 5,890 5,502 5,942 41,203 3.14 5.01
Summary statistics
Mean 5,450 5,696 5,897 39,465 5,181 5,606 5,359 39,901 3.15 4.61
CV 0.111 0.159 0.170 0.121 0.113 0.187 0.153 0.132 0.016 0.083
Min 4,464 3,433 3,797 33,413 4,191 3,569 4,270 31,589 3.08 4.12
Max 6,434 7,083 7,010 48,083 5,890 6,945 6,605 48,450 3.20 5.25
aYields for cereals contain 15% moisture. Yields of all crops are yields of produce of saleable standard.
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in the experiment, we collected the 2001–2010 annual average price information for potatoes from
the Norwegian agricultural price reporting office (NIBIO, 2015) and adjusted for inflation (2018
level, based on CPI). We then used the adjusted data to represent the distribution of potato prices
for the different states (Table 2).
Based on the discussion above, prices for barley and oats are assumed to be deterministic, fixed
at the prices farmers got in 2018, that is, NOK 2.61/kg and NOK 2.38/kg for barley and oats,
respectively (NIBIO, 2018).
3.3.3. Costs
For inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, quantities were taken from the average appli-
cation rates recorded in the experiment, while prices were assumed to be deterministic at the 2018
price level (Table 3). Operating costs, including operating machinery, labor, and post-harvesting
operations costs, were collected from the Norwegian Handbook for Agricultural Operation
Planning (NIBIO, 2018), which reported the current machine contracting rates. Fixed costs, mea-
sured in NOK, were assumed to be equal to the average fixed costs for a typical Norwegian farm
that has a size of approximately 32 ha and were based on data from Statistics Norway and the 2014
report of the Norwegian farm accountancy survey (NIBIO, 2014), adjusted to 2018 price level
(based on the CPI).
Crop area payments in Norway are crop- and region-based. (What are called “area payments”
are not paid by farmers, rather they are subsidies paid to the farmers.) The planted crops, land-
scape characteristics, soil quality, and the size of the farm determine the amount of area payment
each farmer receives. In consideration of environmental impacts and soil runoff, tillage in spring
rather than in autumn is recommended and is subsidized by the government, especially for farm-
land having a steep slope and lying close to water courses. Region-specific subsidies in Norway
have been given to farmers where mechanical weeding and reduced pesticides have been applied.
The regional subsidies are decided by the regional government and may vary from place to place.
In our net income model, we included the subsidy payments based on the 2018 subsidy policies
and the Oppland regional subsidy scheme (Fylkesmannen, 2018).
Table 3. A summary of costs, area payments, and other subsidies (NOK/ha) in 2018 price level
Conventional cropping system IPM cropping system
Wheat Barley Oats Potatoes Wheat Barley Oats Potatoes
Cost of seeds 1,541 1,309 1,231 20,287 1,832 1,600 1,522 20,287
Cost of fertilizer 2,534 2,138 2,138 6,003 1,782 1,980 1,980 4,584
Cost of pesticides 4,076 1,219 542 1,162 3,979 978 474 965
Operational cost 9,296 9,296 8,954 24,462 9,628 9,371 9,029 27,670
Other variable Costsa 214 214 214 214 535 535 535 535
Fixed costs 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506 3,506
Total costs 21,167 17,682 16,585 55,635 21,262 17,970 17,045 57,548
Area payments 1,980 1,980 1,980 850 1,980 1,980 1,980 850
Subsidies 1b – – – – 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Subsidies 2c – – – – 500 500 500 2,000
aCost related to implementing IPM principles and regulations, that is, participating in training and advisory groups, pest monitoring.
bSubsidies for not ploughing in autumn.
cSubsidies for mechanical weeding and reduced pesticides usage.
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3.4. Stochastic simulation model
Since yields and wheat and potatoes prices were assumed stochastic, we specified a multivariate
stochastic simulation model, where we used a copula to account for stochastic dependency2.
Copulas allow joining together of separate marginal distributions of the individual stochastic var-
iables, accounting for the stochastic dependency between these distributions (Hardaker et al.,
2015, pp. 64–78). Copulas allow for more flexibility in stochastic dependency compared to, for
example, the multivariate normal distribution specification.
We chose to specify yields as empirical probability distributions, assuming continuous distri-
butions, by interpolating between the specified points of the distribution, that is, piecewise linear
distributions that closely reflected the experimental observations (see Table 2). An empirical yield
probability distribution will “let the data speak” and in that way better reflect the observed data
than applying some standard distribution such the normal distribution. We specified wheat and
potatoes prices as PERT distributions. A PERT distribution is an assumed continuous probability
distribution, defined by the minimum, most likely, and maximum values (Hardaker et al., 2015,
pp. 46–48). PERT stands for Program Evaluation and Review Technique, in which applications
PERT distributions are commonly used. In specifying the wheat price PERT distribution we used a
minimum price of NOK 2.75/kg, which is below the observed minimum wheat price from the
experiment (NOK 3.08/kg, Table 2). This was done since NOK 2.75/kg is the price if the wheat
is categorized suitable for animal feed only, not for human consumption. Although never observed
in the long-term cropping system experiment, such an outcome is clearly possible in the event of
unfavorable seasonal conditions.
The stochastic dependencies between the six distributions (yields of wheat, barley, oats, potatoes,
and prices of wheat and potatoes), of the conventional and the IPM cropping systems respectively,
were modeled with the Clayton copula. The Clayton copula belongs to the class of asymmetric cop-
ulas and exhibits positive lower tail dependency. It is fitted using the rank-order correlationmeasure
called Kendall's tau (Hardaker et al., 2015, pp. 68–71), which is a distribution-free correlation mea-
sure. Allowing for lower tail dependency can be regarded as a good property for our study, and for
farm systems in general, since bad seasons can bring both low yields and bad quality of the output,
affecting prices, while in good seasons the yields and prices are typically more variable.
The simulation model used was programmed in Excel and simulated using the Excel add-in
Simetar© (Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman, 2008). In the simulation, Latin hypercube sam-
pling was used with 10 000 iterations to estimate the performance variables for each of the two
cropping systems.3
The stochastic distributions derived above were combined with the deterministic barley and
oats prices, and the deterministic costs and subsidy information described above were finally
put into equation (1) to derive distributions of net farm income for the two systems as cumulative
distribution functions (CDFs).
We also simulated net farm income for the IPM without regional subsidies, to be able to assess
the role of these subsidies in promoting uptake of IPM by risk-averse farmers.
3.5. Stochastic efficiency analysis
We cannot directly compare the risk efficiency of the two distributions of net farm income, with
and without IPM, because farmers’ attitudes to risk will vary. We therefore opted to compare the
2Stochastic dependency means that the probability distribution of one variable does depend on the value taken by the
probability distribution of another variable (or several other variables). The combination of probability distributions can
be yield and yield (from different crops), yield and price for the same crop, etc. Correlation coefficients provide a measure
of direction and strength of dependence between two or several quantities or prices. Interested readers, see Hardaker et al.
(2015, pp. 64–78).
3For a brief description of specification of copula-based multivariate distributions, see Hardaker et al. (2015, pp. 64–78). For
more detailed treatment of copulas, see McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2005, Ch. 5) and Alexander (2008, Ch. II.6).
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alternatives using stochastic dominance criteria that depend on particular assumptions about the
nature of decision-makers’ preferences for risky income outcomes.
First-order stochastic dominance (FSD) requires only that decision-makers prefer more
income to less. Then, distribution A is first-order stochastically dominant over B if and only if
FA x  ≤ FB x  for all x, where FA x  and FB x  are CDFs of two alternatives. Graphically, FSD
means that FA(x) lies nowhere to the left of FB(x).
If FSD is not found, second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) may allow ranking of the alter-
natives if decision-makers prefer more income to less and are strictly not risk preferring. Then
distribution A is second-order stochastically dominant over B if and only if for all x, with strict
inequality at some x,
R
x
∞ FB t   FA t 	dt ≥ 0 (Hardaker et al., 2015). Graphically, SSD involves
comparing the areas between CDFs that cross. Only the option that lies to the right of the other at
the minimum level of x is a candidate to dominate.
In some cases, FSD and SSD may not discriminate effectively between alternatives, in the sense
that there are too many choices in the efficient set. While there are other more discriminating
forms of dominance that can be tried, Hardaker et al. (2004) proposed an approach named sto-
chastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) to compare the risk efficiency of different
alternatives (Grove, Nel, and Maluleke, 2006; Lien, Hardaker, and Flaten, 2007a; Lien et al.,
2007b; Pendell et al., 2007; Watkins, Hill, and Anders, 2008; Archer and Reicosky, 2009;
Grove and Oosthuizen, 2010; William et al., 2010; Fathelrahman et al., 2011). The SERF approach
requires assumptions to be made about the form of the risk-averse utility function for the perfor-
mance measure (income in our case) and about the range of degrees of risk aversion likely to
include all or most decision-makers. SERF orders a set of alternatives in terms of certainty equiv-
alents (CEs), that is, the net incomes for sure that the decision-makers would each be just willing
to exchange for the uncertain income, given their individual attitudes to risk.
For each risky alternative and for a chosen form of the utility function, the utility of the prob-
ability distribution of income can be defined, for a given degree of risk aversion as:
U x; r x   
Z
U x; r x  dF x  
X
m
i1 U xi; r x  P xi ; rL x  ≤ r x  ≤ rU x  (2)
where r x  is the absolute risk aversion function of a decision-maker and lies between the lower
bound rL x  and the upper bound rU x , and x in our case is eNI in equation (1). The second term
in the equation stands for the continuous case and is converted to its discrete approximation in the
third term for computational purposes. The net income for each alternative can then be converted
to its corresponding utility for selected values of the risk aversion function. P xi  is the associated
probability for each state (year), applied to calculate expected utility as the weighted average of the
utilities.
Partial ordering of alternatives by utility values is the same as partial ordering by CEs
(Hardaker et al., 2004; Lien et al., 2007b). For ease of interpretation, the expected utility values
were converted to CEs by taking the inverse of the utility function:
CE x; r x    U1 x; r x   (3)
The SERF approach is dependent on setting a plausible range for the degree or risk aversion of
the decision-makers under consideration. Risk aversion can be assumed to derive from the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of wealth (w) as wealth increases, typically measured by the relative risk
aversion function rr(w). Anderson and Dillion (1992) proposed a categorization of degree of
risk aversion based on the relative risk aversion for wealth, rr(w) from 0.5 (hardly risk averse)
to 4.0 (extremely risk averse). We chose in our study the negative exponential function with
constant absolute risk aversion as the utility function in terms of income to derive expected
utility values, which were then converted to CEs for a range of degrees of risk aversion. Using
the identity ra(w) = rr(w)/w and assuming that absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth,
ra(w) is approximately constant for an additive change in w, we can say that ra(x) = ra(w)
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(Hardaker et al., 2015, pp. 96–98). Since the outcomes in this analysis are in terms of income, not
wealth, we can therefore write ra(x) = rr(w)/w. Then the relevant range of ra(x) for our purposes
depends on both the above range in rr(w) and the level of wealth, w across client farmers, leading
to the specification of the range of ra(x).
Finally, since maximizing CE is equivalent to maximizing expected utility, when comparing
alternatives, only those cropping systems having the highest (or equal highest) CEs for a chosen
range of absolute risk aversion are risk efficient.
4. Results
In this study, the results below are based on empirical (for yields) and PERT (for prices) distri-
butions and the Clayton copula in the simulation model. The intention with the paper was not to
test different model specifications and copulas. However, as robustness check, we also tested for
several alternative specifications. We tested for empirical distributions for both yields and prices in
combination with Clayton copula, we tested for both normal distributed yields and prices in com-
bination with Clayton copula, and we tested for normal copula. All these model specifications gave
consistent results with our original specification, implying that our results are robust for model
specification errors.4
In terms of first-degree stochastic dominance, we can see from Figure 3, that the CDFs of the
IPM and conventional cropping systems cross each other, so that neither dominates the other in
the FSD sense. The same applies for the conventional and IPM when the current regional subsidies
are taken away. It is clear from the figure that IPM with subsidies first degree dominates IPM with
no subsidies. Since the minimum of IPM without subsides is less than the minimum for the con-
ventional cropping system, IPM without subsidies cannot dominate conventional cropping sys-
tems, but in this case conventional cropping systems dominate IPM without subsidies in the SSD
sense. However, the SSD analyses of the conventional and IPM (with subsidies) cropping systems
were inconclusive, so we moved on to SERF.
The SERF approach described earlier (Section 3.5) was used to further compare the risk effi-
ciency of conventional and IPM (with and without regional subsidies). We evaluated the range of
relative risk aversion with respect to wealth, rr(w), between 0.5 and 4. The typical level of a farmer's
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Figure 3. CDFs of annual net farm income at 2018 price levels. “No subs” means regional subsidies are not included.
4These alternative model specification results are available from the authors upon request.
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Norwegian farmers (NIBIO, 2014). Thus, we obtained the absolute risk aversion coefficients with
respect to income with a lower bound 0.0005 (hardly risk averse) and a higher bound of 0.004
(extremely risk-averse). In the SERF graph below (Figure 4), we included a risk aversion coeffi-
cient of 0 (i.e. risk-neutral), for completeness, even though we suspect that no Norwegian crop
farmers would be totally indifferent to risk.
As mentioned earlier, the results in this study are based on an assumed farm size of 32 ha. As a
sensitivity check, we repeated the analysis assuming farm sizes of both half the original farm size
(16 ha) and double of the original farm size (64 ha). In the case of the half farm size (double the
farm size), we assumed half (double) of the original fixed cost and half (double) of the original
assumed level of wealth. We found no significant changes in the results in terms of the ranking of
the strategies for different levels of risk aversion.
5. Summary and conclusions
A main finding of this study is that, when the regional subsidies are included in IPM cropping
systems, for farmers who are risk-indifferent to moderately risk averse, the conventional system is
perceived as less preferred than IPM. This result is consistent with the finding by Greene et al.
(1985) for IPM strategies in soybean production in Virginia. At very high levels of risk aversion,
the conventional and IPM systems are equally preferred. Such extreme risk-averse farmers might
prefer to continue with conventional farming practices, regarding IPM-level practices as too risky.
Unsurprisingly, our results indicate that IPM cropping system without the regional subsidies are
less preferred than both conventional cropping and IPM with subsidies. Based on the authors’
knowledge, no earlier study has investigated the effects of subsidy level on the ranking of the crop-
ping system strategies (including IPM). The finding emphasizes the importance of those subsidies
if encouraging IPM is a policy objective because of the benefits to human health and the environ-
ment. Lavik et al. (2020) used a multi-attribute approach to support decisions by Norwegian crop
farmers considering adapting IPM and found that the ranking of IPM strategies depended on the
relative weighting of the economic risk, risk of human health, and risk of the environment.
Lowering the risk to health and the environment costs farmers money. Some economists argue
that interference in markets can only be justified if there is market failure, for example, the exis-
tence of externalities. Public health costs and environmental damage are externalities from pesti-
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Figure 4. CEs in NOK of the conventional cropping system and the IPM cropping system with and without subsidies under
different levels of risk aversion. The CEs are calculated based on the probability distributions in Figure 3. “No subs”
represents the case under which regional subsidies are not included.
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the number and kinds of available public instruments to accelerate the adoption of IPM strategies
in such forms as targeted subsidies and improved advisory services. Our results support the prop-
osition that, if the government wants all farmers to adopt to IPM practices, current regional
subsides are about adequate. An increase in the subsidy would, at best, only influence very
risk-averse farmers to adopt IPM practices. However, the benefits of IPM adaptation on human
health and the environment should be better disseminated to the farmers (Lavik et al., 2020).
Subsides apart, another way by which IPM might be promoted would be to make benefits of
adoption less risky for farmers, perhaps by better monitoring and earlier identification of pest and
disease attacks, or perhaps by plant breeding to find cultivars that do better under IPM (Marra,
Pannell, and Ghadim, 2003; Lefebvre, Langrell, and Gomez-y-Paloma, 2015).
Clearly, our findings above are specific to the particular data we had, and hence only to farms
with conditions similar to those at the experimental site, and we should be careful not to draw too
broad general implications from our findings. However, where suitable data can be made available
relevant to other locations, our method could be applied to such data. In fact, the model can be
extrapolated to related situations, for example, by scaling up or down the relative yields to match a
particular case, and/or by adjusting costs and prices.
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